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Abstract 
Adults, preschool children, and nonhuman primates detect and categorize food objects 
according to substance information, conveyed primarily by color and texture.  In contrast, 
they perceive and categorize artifacts primarily by shape and rigidity.  The present 
experiments investigated the origins of this distinction.  Using a looking time procedure, 
Experiment 1 extended previous findings that rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) 
generalize learning about novel food objects by color over changes in shape.  Six 
additional experiments then investigated whether human infants show the same signature 
patterns of perception and generalization.  Nine-month-old infants failed to detect food 
objects in accord with their intrinsic properties, in contrast to rhesus monkeys tested in 
previous research with identical displays.  Eight-month-old infants did not privilege 
substance information over other features when categorizing foods, even though they 
detected and remembered this information.  Moreover, infants showed the same property 
generalization patterns when presented with foods and tools.  The category-specific 
patterns of perception and categorization shown by human adults, children, and adult 
monkeys therefore were not found in human infants, providing evidence for limits to 
infants’ domains of knowledge. 
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Core knowledge and its limits:  The domain of food  
1. Introduction 
 Infant animals, including humans, must come to recognize individual members of 
their social group and predict those individuals’ behaviors, distinguish potential predators 
and prey, learn the layout of their territory so as to navigate efficiently between 
significant locations, select safe and nutritious foods, and identify, categorize, and reason 
about a plethora of objects.  Their learning task is made more challenging by the diversity 
of the world in which they live.  Some entities, like other people and animals, move 
autonomously and change posture, whereas others, like trees and rocks, are relatively 
rigid and stable.  Some entities, like tools, have functional properties that depend largely 
on their shape and rigidity; others, like foods, have functional properties that depend 
largely on their substances.  How do young animals and children come to master this 
diversity?  
Many psychologists have proposed that humans and other animals are endowed 
with special-purpose systems for learning about entities of particular kinds such as 
inanimate manipulable objects, goal-directed agents, animals, foods, social partners, and 
competitors (e.g., Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).  On 
this view, each of a multitude of  “core knowledge” systems emerges early in 
development, serves to identify the entities in its domain by analyzing their distinctive 
characteristics, and supports the acquisition of further knowledge about those entities by 
focusing on the critical features that distinguish different members of the domain. 
Evidence for such systems comes from convergent studies of the distinctive signature 
limits on perceptual, cognitive, and neural processing of entities from different domains, 
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as shown by infant humans and animals, behaviorally competent animals reared under 
controlled conditions, and adult humans living in diverse cultures and environments (for 
reviews, see Spelke, 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). When diverse experiments find 
signature limits that are specific to processing within a given domain, but that are general 
across ages, species, rearing conditions, and cultures, those findings provide evidence for 
a distinct, domain-specific system of core knowledge. 
 In the present work, we ask whether one domain of evolutionary and ecological 
significance – the domain of food – qualifies as a domain of core knowledge (see also 
Rozin, 1990; Rozin & Kalat, 1971; Rozin & Schulkin, 1990).  In particular, we focus on 
previous findings that human adults, children, and animals attend to substance 
information – conveyed by color, texture, and odor – when identifying and classifying 
foods, but attend to other properties such as shape when identifying and classifying 
artifacts.  This research is consistent with the thesis that food forms a distinctive core 
domain.  Nevertheless, the evidence is inconclusive because these distinctive signatures 
of processing in the food domain have not been studied in infants and have received little 
study in animals reared under appropriately controlled conditions.  Thus, we report 
evidence from adult nonhuman primates reared under naturalistic but limited conditions, 
and from human infants.  Across seven experiments, we test whether the distinctive 
patterns of detecting and categorizing food and nonfood objects shown by human adults 
and children are present in these populations.   
1.1. Problems and solutions for generalist animals in the domain of food 
 Food identification and selection are challenging tasks for humans and other 
generalist animals.  Confronted with a great diversity of potential foods, they must avoid 
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inedible substances and choose beneficial and varied sources of nutrition (Rozin, 1976, 
1977, 1990; Rozin & Pelchat, 1988; Rozin & Schulkin, 1990).  Accordingly, a number of 
mechanisms serve to guide generalist animals’ learning and behavior in the food domain 
(for reviews, see Barker, Best, & Domjan, 1977; Rozin & Kalat, 1971; Rozin & Schulkin, 
1990; Shepherd & Raats, 2006).  For example, humans and other animals eat foods that 
satisfy innate taste biases (e.g., for salt; Rozin & Schulkin, 1990), tend to avoid 
unfamiliar foods (e.g., Domjan, 1977; Pliner & Salvy, 2006), readily learn and store 
associations between nausea and ingested substances (e.g., Garb & Stunkard, 1974; 
Garcia, Ervin, & Koelling, 1966; Garcia & Koelling, 1966; Gustavson, 1977; Richter, 
1953; Rozin & Kalat, 1971), and model their food choices after those of conspecifics 
(Galef, 1996; Galef & Beck, 1990; Rozin, 1988, 2007).   
Many of these food selection strategies require organisms to attend to relevant 
intrinsic properties of foods – including taste, color, texture, and odor.   For instance, in 
order to avoid a kind of food that has made it sick in the past, an animal must be able to 
generalize learning about a particular food to new foods with similar properties.  Below 
we summarize previous research investigating attention to food-relevant properties in 
human adults, children, and nonhuman animals.  We focus in particular on studies that 
distinguish organisms’ perception and reasoning about foods vs. artifacts, as this is the 
literature that is the most relevant to the present research questions and findings.  
1.2. Properties that guide classification of food and nonfood objects in human adults and 
children 
Adults attend to color, texture, odor, and taste information when discriminating 
between edible and inedible entities and when categorizing different kinds of foods 
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(Lavin & Hall, 2002; Ross & Murphy, 1999; Rozin & Fallon, 1987).  They reject foods 
based on bad tastes, smells, and unappealing textures (Rozin & Fallon, 1987), and avoid 
foods that smell and taste similar to things that made them sick as children or as adults 
(Bernstein, 1999; Logue, Ophir, & Strauss, 1981; Pelchat & Rozin, 1982).  When 
presented with laboratory tasks in which they must reason about novel entities, adults 
generalize learning about unfamiliar foods according to color, texture, and odor 
information, but generalize learning about unfamiliar artifacts according to shape (Lavin 
& Hall, 2002).  
As young as three years of age, children show the same patterns of learning and 
generalization for foods vs. artifacts as adults (e.g., Lavin & Hall, 2002; Macario, 1991; 
Santos, Hauser, & Spelke, 2002).  In one experiment, Macario (1991) presented three- 
and four-year-old children with novel objects described as things to eat.  Children were 
introduced to a target object (e.g., pink wax in the shape of a wishbone) and then were 
shown two other objects: a “color-match” (e.g., pink wax in the shape of a kidney) and a 
“shape-match” (e.g., green wax in the shape of a wishbone).  When asked which one 
tasted like the target, children were more likely to choose the color match than the shape 
match.  In contrast, children tested with the same novel objects described as toys showed 
the opposite pattern of reasoning:  they were more likely to choose the shape-match than 
the color-match (see also Brown, 1990). 
Preschool-age children also distinguish between properties relevant for classifying 
foods and artifacts when generalizing novel words for unfamiliar entities.  Lavin and Hall 
(2002) taught three-year-old children novel words applied to novel objects and 
substances presented either as foods or as toys.  Like adults, children were more likely to 
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extend novel words by shape than by color, texture, and smell when the stimuli were 
described as toys than when they were described as foods.  In addition to an effect of 
domain (food vs. artifact), there was an effect of solidity (object vs. substance):  
participants were more likely to extend words by shape when the stimuli were solid 
objects than when they were substances (see also Soja, Carey, & Spelke, 1991).  
Adults and children therefore show different patterns of learning and 
generalization for foods and artifacts. These findings in isolation do not reveal, however, 
whether learning about foods depends on a distinctive core system of knowledge. 
Children and adults’ performance could be supported by a dedicated system for analyzing 
foods that is present in infancy and that serves to guide attention to substance information 
throughout the lifespan.  Alternatively, children may learn about the relevant properties 
of foods through experiences with different kinds of entities.  Studies of animals with 
limited exposure to different foods, and studies of minimally experienced human infants, 
can begin to shed light on these possibilities. 
1.3. Properties that guide detection and classification of foods and nonfoods in 
nonhuman animals with controlled or limited exposure to foods 
 Animals possess a broad ability to learn associations between stimulus properties 
and outcomes in several domains.  Classic studies by Garcia and others on poison 
avoidance learning provided evidence for specificity, however, in animals’ learning about 
foods:  when presented with both a bright light and a food paired with nausea, laboratory-
raised rats subsequently avoided the food, but not the light; when the light and food were 
paired with an electrical shock, rats avoided the light instead of the food (Garcia & 
Koelling, 1966). Moreover, when rats became ill after ingesting both a familiar food that 
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had not sickened them in the past and a novel food, they subsequently avoided only the 
latter substance (Revusky & Bedarf, 1967).  These findings and others (see Barker, Best, 
& Domjan, 1977 and Stricker, 1990, for thorough reviews) suggest that animals are 
capable of attending to relevant properties when learning about novel foods.  Does 
animals’ learning about foods depend on a system that privileges information about the 
substance properties?  
 In recent years, research on a semi-free-ranging population of rhesus monkeys 
living on the island of Cayo Santiago has begun to address this question.  This population 
of monkeys lives freely in social groups on a small island colony established in the 1930s 
(Rawlins & Kessler, 1987).  Half of their diet consists of soil, flowers, leaves, and small 
berries available on the island; the remainder is comprised of monkey chow provided at 
feeding stations.  These monkeys therefore have less of an opportunity to learn about 
different types of foods and the properties by which they are detected and classified than 
animals who live and forage in the wild.   
 Two previous lines of work provide evidence that adult monkeys who have lived 
their entire lives in this colony detect and categorize food objects appropriately.  One line 
of research (Munakata, Santos, Spelke, Hauser & O’Reilly 2001) tested whether this 
population of monkeys can parse natural yet novel food objects (e.g., lemons, fresh 
ginger root) in visual displays in which food objects were presented either alone or in 
contact with one another.  Monkeys were tested in a looking time procedure modeled 
after studies of object perception with human infants (Spelke, Breinlinger, Jacobson, & 
Phillips, 1993).  In one experiment, monkeys first viewed two stationary, adjacent food 
objects, one on top of the other.  Then, a human hand grasped the top of the upper object 
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and lifted either that object, or both objects together, into the air.  The outcome displays 
remained at rest for 10 s, while monkeys’ looking times were recorded.  Looking times in 
the experimental conditions were compared to looking times of monkeys in a baseline 
condition, who viewed only the two outcome displays with each object held by a hand.  
Monkeys in the experimental condition looked longer at the event in which the two food 
objects moved together, relative to baseline, providing evidence that they perceived the 
boundary between the objects in the display.  A second experiment used the same method 
but presented a single stationary object, followed by outcome events in which the object 
moved as a whole or only its top half moved into the air.  In this experiment, monkeys in 
the experimental condition looked equally at events in which the object moved as a whole 
vs. broke apart, relative to baseline.  This second finding suggests that monkeys saw each 
food object as a potentially breakable entity, perhaps because food objects are meant to 
be taken apart and eaten. 
The studies by Munakata et al. (2001) indicate that rhesus monkeys use property 
information in (initially) static displays to reason about likely boundaries of food objects, 
and they suggest that monkeys do so in a manner that is particularly appropriate to the 
parsing and tracking of food objects.  These studies do not, however, provide clear 
evidence for domain specificity in monkeys’ apprehension of food objects.  First, 
multiple properties were available to guide monkeys’ parsing of foods in these 
experiments, including color, texture, and shape.  Additionally, monkeys were never 
presented with analogous displays containing inedible objects, so it is unclear whether the 
patterns observed are unique to perception of foods. 
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A second line of research – focused on categorization – has directly assessed 
monkeys’ attention to color vs. shape when generalizing learning about unfamiliar foods 
and artifacts (Santos, Hauser, & Spelke, 2001; Santos, Miller, & Hauser, 2003).  In one 
food categorization study, for example, a human experimenter first pretended to eat a 
novel object (e.g., a piece of pink Play-Doh in the shape of a sphere), so as to provide 
information that the object was edible.  Following this familiarization event, monkeys 
were allowed to choose between an object of the same color as the target, but in a new 
shape (e.g., pink Play-Doh in the shape of a donut) vs. with an object of the same shape 
as the target, but in a new color (e.g., green Play-Doh in the shape of a sphere).  Monkeys 
selectively approached the food that matched the target’s color, demonstrating that they 
generalized learning about food objects by color over shape (Santos et al., 2001). 
In contrast to their reasoning in the food domain, monkeys from this colony were 
found to use shape information when learning about novel tools (Santos et al., 2003).  
Santos et al. (2003) tested adult monkeys using a looking time procedure in which 
participants were habituated to scenes of a novel tool (e.g., an “L” made from purple 
clay) pushing a small grape down a ramp.  At test, monkeys watched trials in which the 
pushing action was performed by a tool with the same shape, but new color (e.g., an “L” 
made from pink clay) vs. trials in which the event was performed by a tool with the same 
color but new (nonfunctional) shape (e.g., a stubby stick made from purple clay).  
Monkeys looked longer at the latter type of trial, providing evidence that they see shape 
as a more critical property than color for classifying objects (see also Hauser, 1997).   
Although these findings suggest that monkeys identify food objects by their 
substance properties, all the above studies have a critical shortcoming:  The particular 
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objects used to test for sensitivity to shape and substance properties differed for the food 
objects vs. the tools.  In particular, the food objects presented to monkeys had relatively 
simple shapes and relatively intricate and interesting textures, whereas the tool objects 
presented to monkeys had a more interesting and prominent shape.  A critical question, 
therefore, is whether monkeys would show differing patterns of learning and 
generalization if the same objects, with the same shape and substance properties, were 
used either as foods or as tools.  Experiment 1 addresses this question with the methods 
and objects from Santos et al. (2003) presented in a food context. 
1.4. Properties that guide parsing and classification of foods and nonfoods in human 
infants 
There is a large literature devoted to understanding food acceptance and selection 
in children after the weaning period – including the development of taste preferences, 
neophobia, and notions of disgust (e.g., Birch & Marlin, 1982; Birch, McPhee, Steinberg, 
& Sullivan, 1990; Cooke, Wardle, & Gibson, 2003; Fallon, Rozin, & Pliner, 1984; Pliner 
& Stallberg-White, 2000; for reviews see Birch, 1990; Birch & Fisher, 1996; Rozin, 
1990; and Rozin, 1996) – but little research has directly investigated young infants’ 
perception and categorization of foods.  Nevertheless, a wealth of research has 
investigated human infants’ detection and categorization of nonfood objects, and the 
findings of this research contrast with the above findings on monkeys’ individuation and 
categorization of foods. 
Infants often fail to perceive object boundaries in stationary displays by analyzing 
the colors, textures, and forms of surfaces when they are presented either with simple 
geometric shapes (Kestenbaum, Termine & Spelke, 1987; Spelke et al., 1993) or with 
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familiar, meaningful objects such as toy animals and vehicles (Xu, Carey & Welch, 1999; 
although see Needham & Baillargeon, 2000, for exceptions).  Instead, studies suggest that 
infants perceive the unity and boundaries of objects primarily by analyzing the spatial 
relationships and motions of surfaces, grouping together surfaces that are in contact and 
that undergo common motion (e.g., Jusczyk, Johnson, Spelke & Kennedy, 1999; Kellman 
& Spelke, 1983; Spelke, von Hofsten & Kestenbaum, 1989; see Kellman & Arterberry, 
1998, and Condry, Smith, & Spelke, 2001, for reviews).  Although surface colors and 
forms do influence object perception under certain conditions (Johnson & Aslin, 1996; 
Needham, 1997; Smith, Johnson, & Spelke, 2003), the findings suggest the primacy of 
spatio-temporal properties in infants’ perception of objects (Carey & Xu, 2001; Spelke, 
1990).  None of these experiments, however, presented food objects with shapes and 
textures like those tested by Munakata et al. (2001) with monkeys. It is possible, 
therefore, that human infants would show the same distinctive processing of food objects 
shown by adult monkeys, if they were tested with the same displays.   
There is a similar gap in studies of infants’ object categorization. Numerous 
experiments provide evidence that infants use shape information, but not substance 
properties, when generalizing learning about artifact objects (Graham, Kilbreath, & 
Welder, 2004; Welder & Graham, 2001).  For example, infants as young as 13 months of 
age generalize learning about hidden properties (e.g., rattling, squeaking) of artifacts by 
shape (across changes in texture), but not by texture (over changes in shape) (Graham et 
al., 2004).  Further studies have investigated infants’ learning about animals, providing 
evidence that 7-month-old infants generalize learning about animals and their motions by 
shape (over changes in color), but not by color (Shutts, Markson, & Spelke, 2009). To 
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our knowledge, no studies to date have investigated infants’ use of shape and substance 
properties in learning about foods.  Do infants, like adult monkeys, categorize foods 
according to substance information, and therefore show distinctive learning patterns in 
the food domain?  
1.5. Overview 
 The current paper is comprised of three parts, each addressing one of the above 
three open questions.  In Part 1, we use a looking time method to investigate adult 
monkeys’ learning and generalization about foods and tools, using the same objects and 
object properties to test learning in the two domains (Experiment 1).  In Part 2, we use 
the method of Munakata et al. (2001) to investigate 9-month-old infants’ perception of 
the unity and boundaries of food objects, using the same object displays as those used in 
Munakata et al’s studies of monkeys (Experiments 2 and 3). In Part 3, we use a looking 
time procedure to investigate whether 8-month-old infants show specific patterns of 
learning and generalization for foods (Experiments 4-6) and artifacts (Experiment 7). 
2. PART 1:  rhesus monkeys’ selective generalization of learning about objects 
The subjects for this experiment were adult rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
living in the Cayo Santiago field site (Rawlins & Kessler, 1987).  Approximately half of 
the monkeys’ diet consists of Purina monkey chow provided at feeding stations; the 
remainder consists of leaves, flowers, small berries, and soil found on the island.  
Although subjects in this population are semi-free-ranging, they have less experience 
with natural food objects than animals living in the wild, and no experience with the 
kinds of food objects presented in Experiment 1. 
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 Experiment 1 investigated whether monkeys show different patterns of 
generalization for food objects than for artifacts.  To address this question, the 
experiment was conducted using the objects, events, and procedures of previous studies 
of this population that focused on monkeys’ artifact categories (Santos et al., 2003).  The 
procedure was a familiarization paradigm like that of Experiment 1 of Santos et al. 
(2003), except that instead of using an object as a tool, the experimenter pretended to eat 
it.  As in the Santos et al. (2003) experiment, monkeys were presented with an L-shaped 
object of a distinctive color, held by an experimenter on three trials.  Whereas the 
monkeys in the past research saw the experimenter use the object as a tool, those in the 
present study saw the experimenter taste the object.  Then, the monkeys viewed test trials 
with two new objects:  one of a different color and the other of a different, truncated 
shape.  In the experiments of Santos et al. (2003), monkeys looked longer when the 
artifact object appeared with a changed shape than when it appeared with a changed 
color.  If they did so because they generally prefer to look at shape changes, then they 
should show a similar pattern in this experiment; namely, they should look longer at the 
shape change test condition than at the color change condition.  However, we predicted 
that subjects would show a different pattern of looking in this experiment, responding 
more to a change in the food object’s color than a change in its shape.  In contrast to their 
performance with tool objects, rhesus monkeys should look longer at a color change test 
trial than a shape change test trial when the objects they view are treated as foods. 
2.1. Experiment 1 
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2.1.1 Method 
 2.1.1.1 Subjects.  Twenty-two monkeys were successfully tested in this 
experiment.  Only monkeys found to be relatively isolated from other group members 
were chosen to participate.  Thirteen additional subjects were tested but did not complete 
testing due to subject inattention, interference from other animals, previous testing, 
and/or experimental error.  Two other subjects’ data were eliminated during coding by 
the coder (who was blind to condition) because the videotape was judged too blurry to 
code. 
2.1.1.2. Apparatus.  Figure 1 presents the events and objects in this experiment.  
The objects were two different stick shapes (one L-shaped stick, and one stick with a 
stubby base) made from purple or pink clay.  The objects were identical to the ones used 
as tool stimuli in Santos et al. (2003), and were placed on a stage identical to that used in 
Santos et al. (2003).  
 2.1.1.3. Procedure.  Monkeys were tested in the field.  One experimenter 
presented the displays to the subject, while another recorded the subject’s looking 
behavior using a video camera.  Each subject viewed three familiarization trials and two 
test trials. In each of these trials, subjects watched the following series of events: The 
experimenter picked up the object from the stage and then showed the subject the object 
(e.g., a purple L-shaped object).  As the subject watched, the experimenter placed the 
object in his mouth, mouthed the object for 3 s, and said “Mmm.”  The experimenter then 
placed the object on the upper platform and called “Start” and the subject’s looking time 
was recorded for the next 10 s.  This familiarization trial was repeated three times.  Other 
than the eating actions, this procedure was the same as in Santos et al. (2003, Exp. 1). 
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 After viewing all three familiarization trials, subjects were given two test trials: a 
new shape test trial and a new color test trial.  Each of these tests was identical to the 
familiarization trial, except that subjects watched the experimenter eat a novel object.  In 
the new color condition, the experimenter pretended to eat an object of the same shape 
but new color (e.g., pink L-shaped object). In the new shape condition, the experimenter 
pretended to eat an object of the same color but new shape (e.g., purple stubby stick).  
After pretending to eat the object, the experimenter placed the novel object on the upper 
platform and called “Start” and the subject’s looking time was recorded for the next 10 s.  
As in previous experiments, each subject received one trial of each test condition. 
2.1.1.4. Coding. As in the previous experiments (Santos et al., 2003), videotapes 
were acquired onto a Macintosh computer and were analyzed with Adobe Premiere 
software.  These digitized sequences were scored by one coder who was blind to the 
experimental condition.  The coder examined looking during each frame (30 frames = 1 
s) of the 10 s looking period that followed each trial. A look for the purposes of these 
experiments refers to a period of 5 frames or longer during which the subject's head was 
oriented towards the stage. A second coder then scored a subset of these trials to establish 
reliability (r = .80). 
2.2. Results 
 All subjects appeared to habituate across the first three trials: They looked reliably 
less on the third familiarization trial than on the first (t(21) = 3.75, p < .001).  We then 
examined whether or not they recovered looking on the test trials. Monkeys looked 
longer to both the new shape test trial (t(21) = 2.32, p < .05) and the new color test trial 
(t(21) = 3.91, p < .001).  However, although monkeys looked longer in both test trials 
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than in the previous familiarization trial, they showed a significant difference in looking 
between the two test trials (t(21) = 3.17, p < .005).  In contrast to monkeys tested by 
Santos et al. (2003), those in the present study looked significantly longer at the color 
change trial than at the shape change trial (see Figure 2).   
 A repeated-measures ANOVA with experiment as a between-subject factor, and 
test condition (shape change test or color change test) as a within-subject factor was 
conducted to compare results from Santos et al.’s (2003; Experiment 1) tool experiment 
to the present findings.  This analysis revealed only a marginal main effect of experiment 
(F(1,43)= 3.8, p = .06) and no effect of test condition (F(1,43) = 1.01, n.s.), suggesting 
that subjects do not differ in their overall duration of looking in the two experiments or at 
the two test displays.  There was, however, a significant interaction between experiment 
and test condition (F(1,43) = 19.05, p < .001).  Subjects demonstrated a different pattern 
of looking across the two experiments, looking longer at the shape change in Santos et al. 
(2003) and looking longer at the color change in the current Experiment 1. 
-- insert Figure 2 about here -- 
3. General Discussion of Part 1 
 In Experiment 1, monkeys were presented with events in which a human 
experimenter ate a novel object and then later ate a new object with either a new shape or 
a new color.  We found that subjects noticed both featural changes; subjects recovered 
looking to a change in the eaten object’s color and to a change in the eaten object’s shape.  
However, the magnitude of looking differed reliably across the two featural changes.  
Monkeys looked almost twice as long when the experimenter ate a differently-colored 
object than when the experimenter ate a differently-shaped object.  This finding suggests 
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that although monkeys detected both changes they found a change in a food’s color to be 
more salient than a change in the food’s shape. This result is consistent with previous 
findings with this population using an object choice task (see Santos et al., 2001).  
This pattern of looking longer at changes in an object’s color stands in contrast to 
the pattern observed by Santos et al. (2003) where the same object was used as a tool.  In 
those experiments, monkeys attended more to a change in the object’s shape and showed 
no increase in looking time to a change in its color.  The statistical interaction between 
the experiments suggests that monkeys do not have a general bias to attend to changes in 
an object’s shape.  Instead, the featural changes that monkeys find salient seem to depend 
on the context in which the object is introduced.  When monkeys observe an object acting 
as a tool, they attend more to its shape; when they observe the very same object being 
eaten, they attend more to its color. Because the same objects and a highly similar 
method, were used across these experiments, monkeys’ differential generalization 
provides evidence for domain-specific learning about foods and nonfoods.   
Since the participants in these experiments had no experience with the food 
objects in Experiment 1 and relatively impoverished experience with diverse foods in 
their environment, the findings may be explained by the existence of distinct core 
systems for representing and learning about food vs. nonfood objects.  Nevertheless, 
monkeys on Cayo Santiago had had opportunities to learn about food-relevant properties 
over the course of their lives.  Therefore, the remaining experiments tested for core 
knowledge of foods in a population with even less relevant experience, namely human 
infants. 
4. PART 2:  human infants’ individuation of food objects 
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 The experiments in this section test whether 9-month-old human infants, like 
adult rhesus monkeys, parse food objects according to intrinsic features available in static 
displays.  Although many experiments have investigated infants’ parsing of objects, all 
studies to date have used artifact objects – either simple geometrical solids or familiar 
artifacts such as cups, books, and toy cars (Kestenbaum et al., 1987; Spelke et al., 1993; 
Xu et al., 1999).  These experiments provide evidence that infants often fail to parse 
objects at color, texture, and shape boundaries in stationary displays.  One possibility is 
that young infants are generally unable to use static properties to parse objects of any 
kind.  Another possibility is that infants would be able to parse objects at boundaries 
when viewing objects for which substance properties are particularly relevant (i.e., 
foods), and/or objects with more complex and natural shapes and textures. 
A series of studies using a preferential looking method illustrate the methods, 
findings, and limitations of previous research on infants’ object parsing.  In these studies 
(Spelke et al., 1993), infants aged 3-9 months were presented repeatedly either with a 
single, homogeneous object or with two objects of contrasting shapes and colors, one on 
top of the other on a supporting surface.  While the object(s) remained at rest, a hand 
entered the display and grasped its top, and then looking time was measured until the 
infant looked away from the display. Following habituation, infants were given a series 
of test trials presenting two alternating events:  The object array appeared as before, the 
hand grasped and lifted the top of the display, and either (1) the top half of the display 
moved alone while the bottom half remained at rest on the surface (a natural motion in 
the case of two separate objects, but unnatural for one object) or (2) the entire object 
display rose together into the air (a natural motion in the case of a single object, but 
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unnatural for two separate objects).  Looking times to the outcomes of these events were 
measured and compared to those of a separate group of infants in a baseline condition, 
who viewed the same outcome displays with no prior exposure to the original 
arrangement of objects.  
Infants as young as 3 months looked longer at the event in which the single object 
broke apart, providing evidence that they perceived the homogeneous object as a single, 
cohesive body.  In contrast, infants as old as 9 months showed no differential looking at 
the events in which the two stationary objects moved separately or together.  Because 
infants look longer at events in which two distinct objects move together when the 
objects are separated in space or undergo relative motion (Kestenbaum et al., 1987; 
Spelke et al., 1989; von Hofsten & Spelke, 1985), this finding suggests that infants 
perceive object boundaries specified by surface arrangements and motions, but 
sometimes fail to perceive object boundaries specified by surface colors, textures, or 
forms.  
This conclusion contrasts markedly with the findings of Munakata et al. (2001), 
who used a variation of Spelke et al.’s (1993) method to test rhesus monkeys’ parsing of 
food objects.  Because the displays from past studies of infants differ from those used 
with monkeys, however, the source of the differing results is not clear. In particular, the 
above studies, like most studies of object parsing in infancy, presented artifact objects 
with geometrically regular shapes and uniform textures.  In contrast, the objects presented 
to monkeys were natural food objects with natural shapes and complex textures.  It is 
possible that infants and monkeys alike will parse natural objects differently from 
uniform geometrical solids.  
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The present experiments therefore investigate human infants’ perception of the 
unity and boundaries of natural food objects using the displays of Munakata et al. (2001).  
Experiment 2 investigated infants’ perception of two adjacent food objects of contrasting 
color, texture, and shape.  If human infants perceive natural food objects in the same 
manner as adult monkeys, then they should parse these objects as separate units and look 
longer when they move rigidly together.   In contrast, if infants perceive natural food 
objects in the same manner as they perceive manufactured objects, then they may fail to 
perceive these objects as separate units.  In Experiment 3, we investigated infants’ 
perception of a single food object of a single, natural color and texture.  If human infants 
perceive single food objects as do adult monkeys, then they should fail to perceive a 
single food object as an unbreakable whole and should look equally at events in which 
the food object moves as a rigid unit vs. breaks apart.  In contrast, if infants perceive food 
objects in the same manner as manufactured objects, then they should perceive the single 
object as a unit and look longer when its unity is broken by separate motion of the top 
half of the object, as in past research (Spelke et al., 1993).  
In order to maximize the comparability of the infant and monkey experiments, the 
infants in Experiments 2 and 3 were tested with the same types of food objects in the 
same arrangements as were the monkeys in the studies of Munakata et al. (2001).
 
 A more 
difficult decision concerned the testing procedure, which differed in one respect in the 
past experiments with monkeys vs. infants:  monkeys were given far briefer exposure to 
the initial array of objects than infants because, as unrestrained adults, they were 
expected to form a representation of the object array more rapidly than infants and to 
walk away from the display, ending the experiment, if shown the same events over many 
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repetitions.  Because pre-locomotor infants might need longer exposures in order to form 
object representations, we decided to maximize infants’ chances of perceiving all the 
objects correctly by using the full habituation method of Spelke et al. (1993).   
4.1. Experiment 2 
 Nine-month-old infants were tested in two conditions:  experimental and baseline.  
Infants in the experimental condition were habituated to two stationary food objects 
arranged one on top of the other on a puppet stage. Then the infants were tested with 
events in which a hand grasped the top object and either just that object, or both objects, 
rose rigidly into the air and then remained stationary.  Looking time was recorded, 
beginning at the end of the motion and ending when the infant looked away from the 
display.  Infants in the baseline condition were presented with the same event outcomes 
with no prior motion:  a stationary display in which the hand held either the top object or 
both objects in the air.  If infants perceived the two food objects as two separately 
movable bodies, then the infants in the experimental condition were expected to look 
longer at the outcome of the event in which the objects moved rigidly together, and this 
preference should have exceeded any baseline preference for that outcome display.  
As in past research with monkeys, infants were tested with a miniature pumpkin 
on top of a piece of ginger root (see Fig. 3, left).  These displays were motionless during 
the habituation events.  For the test events of the experimental condition, a single hand 
grasped the pumpkin and lifted it, and either the grasped object moved by itself (relative 
motion) or the two objects moved together (common motion).  The former event appears 
natural to adults and the latter event appears unnatural.  In the test events of the baseline 
condition, either a hand held the top object, or a hand held both of the objects by grasping 
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the pair at the boundary and supporting both objects.  Both these displays appear natural 
to adults. 
-- insert Figure 3 about here -- 
4.1.1. Participants.  Participants were 20 9-month-old infants (15 males; M=9 
months, 1 day; range = 8 months, 15 days to 10 months, 0 days).  One additional infant 
was tested but not included in data analyses because of experimenter error. 
4.1.1.2. Displays.  Displays were presented on a stage composed of white foam-
core measuring 75-cm (wide) x 30-cm (tall) x 38-cm (deep).  Above the stage was a 75-
cm x 30-cm screen that could be lowered to occlude the display stage between trials.  The 
objects were a miniature orange pumpkin (6-cm tall x 8-cm diameter) and a segment of 
tan ginger root (4-cm tall x 4-cm diameter x 12-cm long).  In the display, the pumpkin 
rested on top of the ginger root.  During test trials, the experimenter’s hand reached down 
into the display and lifted the pumpkin 10 cm above the floor of the stage, then paused 
there for the duration of the trial.  The infant was seated in a high chair positioned 80 cm 
from the front of the stage.  The display objects subtended visual angles of 5.8° x 5° 
(pumpkin) and 8.6° x 2.2° (ginger root).  
4.1.1.3. Design.  Ten infants participated in the experimental condition, and 10 
participated in the baseline condition.  Half the participants in each condition were tested 
with each order of test trials (common motion first vs. relative motion first).  The 10 
infants in the baseline condition of this experiment also participated in the baseline 
condition of Experiment 3, separated by a break of about 3 minutes; half the infants 
received the present baseline condition first. 
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4.1.1.4. Procedure.  Infants were seated in a high chair facing the display stage 
and were accompanied by a parent who was seated behind the infant.  The study began 
with calibration in which the experimenter used a squeaking toy to direct the baby’s 
attention to all parts of the display area, signaling to the coders the target area of the 
infant’s eye movements.  Coders were seated in a separate room viewing a video feed 
showing only the infant’s face, and were thus unaware of the infant’s condition.  Coders 
depressed buttons connected to a Gateway 2000 computer to indicate when the infant was 
attending to the display.  The computer recorded the infant’s looking time on each trial 
and calculated inter-observer agreement.  The start of each trial was controlled by the 
experimenter, who initiated computer recording.  Trials ended when the infant looked 
away from the display for 2 s consecutively or once 60 s had elapsed.  Once calibration 
was complete, the occluder screen was lowered to occlude the stage and the experiment 
began.   
On each habituation trial of the experimental condition, the screen was raised to 
reveal the pair of objects situated one on top of the other.  The experimenter’s hand 
reached down into the display from behind a curtain, tapped on the top object with one 
finger, and then came to rest on the top object.  Recording of the infant’s looking time 
began when the hand came to rest on the top object, and was controlled by the 
experimenter who pressed a key connected to the recording computer.  Habituation trials 
continued in this manner until criterion of a 50% decline in looking was reached.  The 
criterion for habituation was a defined as three consecutive trials whose average time was 
less than half of the average of the first three habituation trials.  Once the infant reached 
criterion, test trials began.  On each test trial, the screen was raised to reveal the same two 
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objects as in the habituation trials.  The experimenter’s hand reached down into the 
display and grasped the top object, then lifted it 10 cm above the stage floor and paused 
there for the duration of the trial.  On the Relative Motion trial, the top object was lifted 
alone.  On the Common Motion trial, both objects rose when the top one was lifted 
because they had been surreptitiously connected. Recording of the infant’s looking time 
began when the hand and object(s) came to rest, and was controlled by the experimenter 
who pressed a key at the end of the motion.  
Infants in the baseline condition were presented with the two test trial events 
without habituation.  These test trials presented the same pair of objects (pumpkin/ginger) 
as in the experimental condition, except the objects were stationary throughout the trial.  
In each trial of the baseline, the screen was raised to reveal the two objects and the 
experimenter’s hand holding one or both of the objects 10 cm above the stage.  This 
display mimicked the final outcome in the experimental test trials with the experimenter’s 
hand holding the objects in mid-air, but did not show the objects being lifted.  In the 
Relative Motion outcome, the experimenter held only the top object.  In the Common 
Motion outcome, the experimenter held both objects by grasping them at their juncture, 
thus supporting both objects with one hand.  Half of the infants in each condition saw 
each outcome first.  
4.1.5. Dependent measures and analyses.  Looking time was recorded during the 
outcome displays by two condition-blind independent observers.  Inter-observer 
agreement, assessed as the correlation between button presses by the two observers, was 
calculated by the computer 10 times/s during each trial and averaged over the experiment.  
Inter-observer agreement averaged 91% in Experiment 2.  
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Paired-sample t tests were used to compare infants’ looking on the last habituation 
trial to looking on each of the two test trials in the experimental condition, as well as to 
compare looking on separated vs. connected test outcomes in each condition.  Test trial 
data were also subjected to a 2 (condition:  experimental vs. baseline) by 2 (test motion:  
relative vs. common) ANOVA.   
4.2. Results 
Figure 4 (left) presents looking time on the last habituation trial for the infants in 
the experimental condition, as well as looking time to each of the test outcomes for 
infants in both conditions.  Infants in the experimental condition showed marginally 
increased looking from the last habituation trial to each of the two test trials (relative 
motion: t(9) = 2.26, p = .05; common motion: t(9) = 2.08, p = .067).  There was no 
difference between infants’ looking at the relative vs. common motion test outcomes in 
the experimental condition (t<1) or in the baseline condition (t(9) = 1.65, n.s.).  The 
ANOVA revealed no effect of condition (F<1), no effect of test outcome (F<1), and no 
interaction between the two variables (F(1,18) = 1.13, n.s.). 
--insert Figure 4 about here— 
4.3. Discussion 
 When human infants were presented with two stationary, adjacent food objects, 
they looked equally at an event in which the top object was lifted and moved on its own 
and one in which the top object was lifted and both objects rose together.  Thus, 
Experiment 2 provides no evidence that infants perceived the two food objects as distinct, 
separately movable bodies. 
                                                                 Core Knowledge and its Limits 27 
Because the principal findings of this experiment were negative, we conducted a 
replication with a new sample of 20 infants (10 in the experimental condition, and 10 in 
the baseline condition).  For the new experiment, we used a second pair of food objects 
that Munakata et al. (2001) had presented to monkeys, and that monkeys had parsed as 
two objects: a green pepper on top of a potato.  The findings of this replication 
experiment were the same as in Experiment 2.  Moreover, when the data from all 40 
infants were considered together, the findings were still negative:  Infants looked equally 
long at the common motion and relative motion trial in both the experimental (common 
motion M = 9.98 s; relative motion M = 10.16 s; t<1) and the baseline condition 
(common motion M = 10.42; relative motion M = 10.78; t<1), and there was still no 
interaction of test outcome by condition (F<1).  However, considering all 40 infants, 
dishabituation to the relative motion and common motion trials in the experimental 
condition moved from marginal to significant (t(19) = 2.87, p < .01; t(19) = 3.12, p < .01, 
respectively), providing evidence that infants dishabituated to both events. 
 The present findings contrast with those of Munakata et al.’s (2001) study of adult 
rhesus monkeys.  When monkeys were tested with the same displays and a similar 
(though briefer) method, they looked reliably longer at the outcome of the unnatural 
event in which the two objects moved together.  This contrast suggests that the ability to 
perceive the boundaries of food objects varies either by species (rhesus monkeys vs. 
humans) or by age (adults vs. 9-month-old infants).  We consider these two possibilities 
in the discussion following Experiment 3. 
 In Experiment 3, we investigated a second aspect of object perception in infancy:  
perception of a single object as a unitary, commonly moving body.  Recall that adult 
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monkeys presented with a single food object appeared not to perceive the object as a 
commonly movable unit, because they looked equally long at events in which the object 
moved as a whole or broke in two.  In contrast, human infants presented with a single 
geometrical solid have been shown through this and other methods to perceive such an 
object as a unit (e.g., Spelke et al., 1993).  If a single system of representation underlies 
infants’ perception of artifact objects and natural food objects, then infants who are 
presented with a single food object also should perceive its unity and should look longer 
at the outcome of an event in which the object breaks apart than at one in which it moves 
as a whole.  
4.4. Experiment 3 
 Nine-month-old infants in the experimental condition were habituated to a single 
stationary food object on the same stage as in Experiment 2. Then the infants were tested 
with events in which a hand grasped the top of the object and either the whole object, or 
just its top half, rose into the air.  Infants in the baseline condition were presented with 
the same event outcomes with no prior motion, and looking times to the outcome displays 
were compared across conditions as in Experiment 2.   
As in past research with monkeys, infants were tested with a lemon (see Fig. 3, 
right).  These displays were motionless during the habituation events.  For the test events 
of the experimental condition, a single hand grasped the top of the lemon and lifted it.  
This event appears natural to adults when the object moves as a whole and unnatural 
when the top half of the object moves separately from the bottom.  In the test events of 
the baseline condition, a single hand held either the whole object or the top half.  Because 
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the object was never previously presented as a whole, both these displays appear natural 
to adults. 
4.5. Method 
 Participants were 20 infants (M = 9 months, 0 days; range = 8 months, 13 days to 
9 months, 17 days), half males and half females, drawn from the same population as in 
Experiment 2.  No additional infants were removed from the sample.  The object was an 
8-cm high x 6-cm diameter ripe lemon.  For relative motion outcome trials the lemon was 
cut in half horizontally.  The cut in the display object was made with a very sharp knife 
such that the cut line was nearly invisible when the two halves were placed together.  
When the halved object was presented in the outcome trials, the infant was able to see a 
part of the inside of the half lemon that was resting on the stage.  The visual angles 
subtended by the display objects measured 4.3° x 5.7° (whole lemon) and 4.3° x 2.9° 
(half lemon).  All other aspects of the displays, events, design, procedure, and analyses 
were the same as in Experiment 2.  Inter-observer agreement averaged 90% in 
Experiment 3. 
4.6. Results 
Fig. 4 (right) presents the data from Experiment 3.  Infants in the experimental 
condition maintained low levels of looking (relative to habituation) at the test outcome in 
which the object moved as a whole (t(9) = 1.49, n.s.), but showed increased looking at the 
test outcome in which the object broke apart (t(9) = 4.13, p < .01).  Infants in the 
experimental condition looked significantly longer at the test outcome in which the object 
broke apart, compared to the outcome in which it moved as a whole (t(9) = 2.34, p < .05), 
while infants in the baseline condition tended to look longer at the test outcome in which 
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the object moved as a whole (t(9) = 2.21, p =.054).  A 2 (condition) by 2 (test outcome) 
ANOVA revealed no effect of condition (F<1) or test outcome (F<1).  Most important, 
there was a significant interaction of condition by test outcome (F(1,18) = 10.36, p < 
.005):  Infants in the experimental condition showed a greater preference for the outcome 
of the event in which the object broke apart than did those in the baseline condition.  
4.7. Discussion 
Presented with a whole lemon that was grasped and lifted, infants looked longer 
when the object broke apart and only its top half rose into the air than when the object 
moved as a whole.  This tendency reliably exceeded baseline looking toward the former 
outcome display.  Taken together, the results provide evidence that infants perceived the 
single lemon as a separately movable whole.  These findings provide a further contrast 
with the findings of studies of adult monkeys (Munakata et al., 2001) and a further 
convergence with the findings of studies of human infants presented with simple artifacts 
(Spelke et al., 1993).  Just as in past research with simple artifacts, infants perceived a 
natural food object as unitary, commonly movable whole. 
 4.8. General Discussion of Part 2 
 The results from Part 2 provide no evidence that human infants parse food objects 
in accord with their substance or shape properties.  In this respect, the findings contrast 
markedly with results from studies of adult rhesus monkeys with minimal food 
experience.  Infants’ performance with food objects in Experiments 2 and 3 accords, 
however, with the performance of infants in many previous experiments using artifacts 
(e.g., Spelke et al., 1993).  The results of Experiment 3 indicate that infants attend to food 
objects and are able to make some predictions about them, but the predictions they make 
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are the same as those made for artifacts.  Therefore, Experiments 2 and 3 provide no 
evidence for food as a domain in human infants’ knowledge. 
Since the objects in Experiments 2 and 3 were not presented in an eating context, 
however, it is possible that infants were not aware they were foods.  To address this 
concern, the experiments of Part 3 provide infants with information about the category 
membership of different substances and objects (e.g., by demonstrating eating for foods). 
In Part 3 we ask whether human infants also differ from adult monkeys in their patterns 
of generalizing learning about foods and artifacts.  Given that the rhesus monkeys in 
Experiment 1 generalized learning about food by its color over its shape, we ask whether 
human infants show the same patterns of domain-specific learning about foods.  
5. PART 3:  Human infants’ categorization of foods and artifacts 
 The present experiments used a habituation of looking time method to test for 
specific patterns of learning and generalization about foods and nonfoods at 8 months of 
age.  We tested 8-month-old infants because this is the age at which most American 
infants have started to consume solid foods as a part of their regular diet.  Food is 
therefore a relevant domain for infants, but a domain about which they might just be 
beginning to learn.  Before investigating infants’ generalization of learning about foods, 
however, we asked whether infants perceive and remember both substance and shape 
properties of food. 
5.1. Experiment 4 
 Experiment 4 investigated whether infants perceive and remember properties of 
food substances and containers.  Separate groups of infants were tested in two different 
conditions.  In the “Color/Texture Discrimination Condition”, infants were habituated to 
                                                                 Core Knowledge and its Limits 32 
an actor eating one type of food substance from one type of container (e.g., green sugar in 
a champagne glass).  At test, they were shown a trial in which the actor ate the familiar 
substance from the familiar container (e.g., green sugar in a champagne glass) vs. a trial 
in which the actor ate a novel food from the familiar container (e.g., orange juice in a 
champagne glass).  If infants discriminate between foods on the basis of substance color 
and texture differences, they were expected to look longer at the test trial in which the 
actor ate the novel food.  In the “Container Discrimination Condition”, infants were 
habituated to an actor eating one type of food from a particular container (e.g., green 
sugar in a champagne glass).  At test, they viewed one trial in which the actor ate from a 
familiar container that held the familiar substance (e.g., green sugar in a champagne 
glass) vs. a trial in which the actor ate from a novel container that held the familiar 
substance (e.g., green sugar in a bowl).  If infants discriminate between food containers 
on the basis of shape, they were expected to look longer at the test trial in which the actor 
ate from the novel container. 
5.2. Method 
 5.2.1. Participants.  The participants were 32 full-term 8-month-old infants (16 
females; M=8 months, 6 days; range = 7 months, 22 days – 8 months, 16 days) drawn 
from the same population as in Experiments 2 and 3.  Eleven additional infants were 
tested, but not included in the final sample due to experimental error (n=1), failure to 
meet the habituation criterion (n=6), equipment failure (n=2), or fussiness (n=1).   
 5.2.2. Materials.  The substances were pulpy orange juice, pulpy orange juice 
dyed green with food coloring, orange sugar crystals (same color as the orange juice), and 
green sugar crystals (same color as the green juice). The containers were clear glass 
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bowls measuring 6 cm in height and 10.5 cm in diameter and clear champagne glasses 
measuring 21 cm in height and 5.5 cm in diameter. 
 5.2.3. Apparatus.  Fig. 5 displays some of the events used in this experiment.  The 
events were presented in a well-lit stage with a viewing area that measured 76 cm (width) 
x 72 cm (height).  The actor, a female wearing a white t-shirt and navy visor, kneeled at a 
white countertop and was visible to infants from the chest up.  White foam core 
surrounded the viewing area and navy curtains were hung behind the actor to conceal 
equipment.  A white shelf was placed on the countertop in front of the actor in order to 
elevate the containers so that they were approximately at infants’ eye-level.  A navy 
curtain with the same dimensions as the viewing area could be raised and lowered to 
reveal and hide the actor and other contents of the stage area between trials.  Soft music 
was played from a small stereo unit hidden behind the stage in order to mask any minor 
sounds made by the actor and experimenter. 
 A lipstick camera mounted below the countertop was used to capture infants’ 
looking, while another camera focused on the stage.   Data were recorded and coded as in 
Part 2.   
-- insert Figure 5 about here -- 
 5.2.4. Design.  Half of infants (n=16) were tested in the Color/Texture 
Discrimination Condition and half were tested in the Container Discrimination Condition.  
The type of substance and container used in the habituation phase were counterbalanced 
across infants in both conditions.  During habituation, half of infants viewed juice and 
half viewed sugar, half saw the substance in orange and half saw it in green, and half 
were shown the glass bowl and half where shown the champagne glass.  During the test 
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trial phase, half of infants in the Color/Texture Discrimination Condition saw the familiar 
substance trial first, while half saw the novel substance trial first.  For infants tested in the 
Container Discrimination Condition, half saw the familiar container test trial first, while 
half saw the novel container trial first. 
 5.2.5. Procedure.  Infants sat on a parent’s lap in a chair approximately 1.5 m 
from the testing stage.  Parents were asked to remain quiet for the duration of the 
experiment and were informed (and later reminded) that they should close their eyes 
during the test trials so that they were blind to the contents of the stage.  
 5.2.6. Familiarization Trial.  The habituation phase was preceded by a brief 
(approximately 8 s) familiarization trial in which the actor picked up the container from 
the white shelf, said “what’s this?” to draw infants’ attention, and then stirred the 
contents of the container with her finger to emphasize that it was a substance.  She then 
took a taste of the substance using her finger, said “yummy” to indicate that it was a food, 
placed the container back on the white shelf, and then looked down.  The actor began the 
event as soon as the curtain was raised; the curtain was lowered as soon as she finished.  
Infants’ looking during the familiarization trial was not recorded and did not count 
toward the criterion for habituation. 
 5.2.7. Habituation Phase.  On every habituation trial, the curtain was raised to 
reveal the actor looking down at a container resting on the shelf in front of her.  The actor 
dipped her finger into the food, took a taste of it, rested her hand on the container, and 
then looked down so that infants could not see her face.  Once the actor’s hand had come 
to rest on the container, an experimenter sitting behind the actor (but not visible to 
infants) pressed a key on the computer to initiate recording of infants’ looking behavior.  
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When infants looked away from the stage for 2 s consecutively or once they had 
accumulated 120 s of looking, the computer beeped to signal the end of the trial and the 
experimenter lowered the screen.  Habituation trials were administered until infants 
reached a criterion of 50% decline in looking time on three consecutive trials, relative to 
the first three consecutive trials that had totaled 12 s or more.  The computer signaled 
when this criterion had been met and then test trials were administered. 
 5.2.8. Test Phase.  Infants viewed two test trials that were identical in procedure 
to habituation trials.  The test pair for the Color/Texture Discrimination Condition 
consisted of one trial where the actor ate a familiar food from a familiar container (i.e., 
same as habituation) and one trial where the actor ate a novel food from the familiar 
container.  The test pair for the Container Discrimination Condition was comprised of 
one trial where the actor ate from a familiar container that contained a familiar substance 
(i.e., same as habituation) and one trial where the actor ate from a novel container that 
contained a familiar substance.   
 5.2.9. Dependent measures and analyses.  Infants’ looking behavior was coded 
online by two independent observers who were blind to condition and trial type. The 
average inter-observer agreement (calculated as in Experiments 2 and 3) in was 94%.  
 Test trial looking times were analyzed by a repeated-measures ANOVA with trial 
type (novel vs. familiar) as a within-subject factor and condition (Color/Texture 
Discrimination vs. Container Discrimination) as a between-subject factor.  Looking times 
within each condition were analyzed using paired-samples t tests.   
5.3. Results 
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 At test, infants looked longer at the novel display in both conditions (see Fig. 6, 
left).  An ANOVA revealed a main effect of trial type (F(1,30) = 7.88, p < .01), no effect 
of condition (F<1), and no interaction of condition by trial type (F<1).  Infants in the 
Color/Texture Discrimination Condition looked longer at the test trial where the actor ate 
the new food than at the test trial where she ate the familiar food (t(15) = 2.52, p < .05).  
Infants’ average looking during the last habituation trial in the Color/Texture 
Discrimination Condition differed significantly from the novel test trial (t(15) = 2.26, p < 
.05), but not from the familiar test trial (t<1).  Infants in the Container Discrimination 
Condition looked marginally longer at the test trial where the actor ate from the novel 
container than at the test trial where she ate from the familiar container (t(15) = 1.96, p = 
.069).  Infants recovered looking from the last trial of habituation to the novel test trial 
(t(15) = 2.13, p <. 05) but not to the familiar test trial (t<1).   
-- insert Figure 6 about here -- 
5.4. Discussion 
 The results from Experiment 4 provide evidence that 8-month-old infants perceive 
and remember properties of food substances when observing eating events.  Additionally, 
the results indicate that our method effectively reveals this ability.  The design of 
Experiment 4 does not reveal whether infants track the substance properties of foods over 
changes in containers, however, since each condition presented only one kind of property 
change (i.e., either a change in the color/texture of the substance or a change in container 
shape), holding all other properties constant.  Experiment 5 therefore was undertaken to 
test whether infants, like adults, young children, and nonhuman primates, show category-
specific learning and generalization in the food domain.  In one condition, we 
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investigated whether infants focus on information about the color and texture of foods by 
testing for generalization by those properties across a change in container.  In another 
condition, we asked whether infants focus on information about containers when learning 
about foods, by testing for generalization by container shape across a change in food 
substance. 
5.5. Experiment 5 
 Experiment 5 investigated whether infants recognize a familiar food when it is 
held in a novel container, and recognize a familiar container when it holds a novel food.  
In the “Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition”, infants were habituated to scenes in 
which an actor ate one type of food substance from one type of container (e.g., green 
sugar in a champagne glass).  Then, in test trials, infants were shown a scene in which the 
actor ate that same food from the new container (e.g., green sugar in a bowl) vs. a scene 
in which the actor ate a new food from a new container (e.g., orange juice in a bowl).  If 
infants generalize learning about a food substance on the basis of color and texture, over 
a change in container shape, they were expected to look longer at the trial where the actor 
ate the new kind of food.  In the “Generalization-by-Container Condition”, infants were 
habituated to an actor eating one type of food substance from one type of container (e.g., 
green sugar in a champagne glass).  In test trials, they were shown a scene in which the 
actor ate from a familiar container that held a new substance (e.g., orange juice in a 
champagne glass) vs. a scene in which the actor ate from a new container that held the 
new substance (e.g., orange juice in a bowl).  If infants generalize learning about food on 
the basis of container shape, over a change in food color and texture, they were expected 
to look longer at the trial where the actor ate from the novel container. 
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5.6. Method 
 The method was the same as Experiment 4, except as follows.  The final sample 
consisted of 32 infants with a mean age of 8 months, 6 days (range = 7 months, 19 days – 
8 months, 19 days).  Eleven additional infants were tested, but not included in analyses 
because of experimental error (n=5), failure to meet the habituation criterion (n=5), or 
extremely lengthy (>3 SDs) looking during the test trial phase (n=1).   
 Sixteen infants were tested in the Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition and 
16 were tested in the Generalization-by-Container Condition.  The test trials for the 
Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition consisted of one trial where the actor ate a 
familiar food substance (i.e., same food as shown during habituation) from a novel 
container and one trial where the actor ate a novel food substance from a novel container 
(see Fig. 5).  The test trials for the Generalization-by-Container Condition consisted of 
one trial where the actor ate from a familiar container (i.e., same container as shown 
during habituation) that held a novel substance and one trial where the actor ate from a 
novel container that held a novel substance.  Average inter-observer agreement was 95%. 
5.7. Results   
 Infants showed no tendency to generalize habituation across changes either in 
food substances or containers (Fig. 6, right).  A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no 
effect of test trial type (F<1), no effect of condition (F<1), and no interaction between the 
factors (F<1).  After habituation, infants in the Generalization-by-Color/Texture 
Condition significantly increased their looking both at the test event with the novel 
substance and container (t(15) = 4.20, p < .001) and at the test event with the familiar 
substance and novel container (t(15) = 4.51, p < .001).  A comparison of looking at the 
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two test events revealed no preference for the novel substance (paired-sample t<1).  
Similarly, infants in the Generalization-by-Container Condition increased their looking 
from the last habituation trial to each kind of test trial (i.e., with the novel substances and 
the novel or familiar containers) (t(15)=  3.19, p < .01, t(15) = 2.53, p < .05, 
respectively).  A comparison of looking at these two test events also revealed no 
preference for the novel container (paired-sample t<1).  
5.8. Discussion 
 The results from Experiment 5 provide no evidence that infants track nonsolid 
foods by their substance properties when they appear in different containers.  If infants, 
like adults, young children, and nonhuman primates, privileged color and texture when 
reasoning about foods, they should have looked longer in the Generalization-by-
Color/Texture Condition at the test trial in which the actor ate the food with the novel 
color and texture.  Instead, infants looked equally long at novel and familiar substance 
test trials.  Results from the Generalization-by-Container Condition indicate that infants 
do not generalize learning by container shape either, as infants looked equally long at 
novel and familiar container test trials.  Infants’ recovery of interest from habituation to 
the test phase in both conditions suggests that they noticed that the foods or containers 
had changed, but they showed no differential interest when both changes occurred at 
once.   
 We hypothesized that infants’ failure to generalize information appropriately in 
Experiment 5 might have stemmed from a general difficulty with representing nonsolid 
substances.  Indeed, recent evidence suggests that even adult non-human primates fail to 
generalize across color when tested with non-solid foods (see Addessi & Visalberghi, 
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2001).  We chose to use nonsolid substances in Experiment 5 because we thought infants 
would be most familiar with foods of that nature.  However, some studies have shown 
that while infants are able to represent solid objects, quantifying and tracking them over 
space and time, infants of 8 months are unable to perform the same operations with 
nonsolid entities (e.g., Huntley-Fenner, Carey, & Solimando, 2002).  Accordingly, 
Experiment 6 investigated infants’ learning and generalization about solid foods. 
5.9. Experiment 6 
 Infants in Experiment 6 were shown novel, solid food objects, rather than 
substances, and were tested for generalization of property information as in Experiment 
5.  Participants in the “Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition” (Fig. 5) were 
habituated to an actor eating a food object with a particular color/texture and shape (e.g., 
a green sugar-coated object in the shape of a champagne glass).  At test, they were shown 
a trial in which the actor tasted an object with the same color/texture, but new shape (e.g., 
a green sugar-coated object in the shape of a bowl) vs. a trial in which she tasted an 
object with a new color/texture and new shape (e.g., an orange smooth object in the shape 
of a bowl).  If infants generalize learning about food objects by color/texture, they were 
expected to look longer at the test trial in which the actor ate the food with the new 
color/texture.  Infants in the “Generalization-by-Shape Condition” were habituated to an 
actor eating one kind of food object (e.g., a green sugar-coated object in the shape of a 
champagne glass).  For the test phase, they viewed a trial in which the actor tasted an 
object with the same shape, but new color/texture (e.g., an orange smooth object in the 
shape of a champagne glass) vs. a trial in which she tasted an object with a new shape 
and new color/texture (e.g., an orange smooth object in the shape of a bowl).  If infants 
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generalize learning about food objects by shape, they were expected to look longer at the 
trial in which the actor ate the food with the new shape. 
5.10. Method 
 The method was very similar to Experiment 5, with the following exceptions:  
The participants were 15 female and 17 male 8-month-old-infants (M = 8 months, 2 days; 
range = 7 months, 17 days – 8 months, 22 days).  Data from 12 additional infants were 
excluded for experimental error (n=4), failure to habituate (n=4), equipment failure 
(n=2), parental interference (n=1), and extremely lengthy (>3 SDs) looking during test 
trials (n=1).  The stimuli were solid “foods” made from lightweight modeling clay, 
sculpted and painted to look like the stimuli used in Experiments 4 and 5.  The foods 
were either in the shape of the champagne glass or in the shape of the bowl and each 
shape came in four different color/texture combinations:  orange paint with smooth 
finish, orange paint coated with orange sugar, green paint with smooth finish, and green 
paint coated with green sugar.   
 On every trial, the actor picked up the food object, pretended to take a bite from 
the back of it, returned it to the white shelf, and left her hand resting on it.  Sixteen 
infants were tested in the Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition.  During test trials, 
they saw the actor eat an object with a familiar color/texture and novel shape vs. an 
object with a novel color/texture and novel shape.  Another group of 16 infants were 
tested in the Generalization-by-Shape Condition.  At test, they saw the actor eat an object 
with a familiar shape and novel color/texture vs. an object with a novel shape and novel 
color/texture.  Reliability between coders was 95%. 
5.11. Results 
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 Infants showed no consistent generalization of habituation to solid food objects, 
either by substance or by shape (Fig. 7, left).  A repeated-measures ANOVA revealed no 
effect of test trial type (F(1,30) = 1.31, n.s.), no effect of condition (F(1,30) = 1.15, n.s.), 
and no interaction between the factors. Infants tested with novel shapes and either 
familiar or novel substances recovered interest from the last habituation trial to both the 
novel and familiar substance test trials (t(15) = 4.08, t(15) = 3.08, p < .01, respectively).  
Comparisons of looking at the two test trials revealed equal looking at the trial where the 
actor ate the food with the novel color/texture as at the trial where she ate the food with a 
familiar color/texture (paired-sample t<1). Infants tested with novel substances and either 
familiar or novel shapes also increased their looking from the last habituation trial to each 
of the test trials, both with the novel shape (t(15) = 4.05, p < .001) and with the familiar 
shape(t(15) = 2.80, p < .05).  They too looked equally long at the trial where the actor ate 
the food with a novel shape and the trial where she ate the food with a familiar shape 
(t(15) = 1.25, n.s.).   
-- insert Figure 7 about here -- 
5.12. Discussion 
 Infants in Experiment 6 failed to generalize information about either the shape or 
the substance properties of solid food objects.  As in Experiment 5, infants looked equally 
long at the novel (color/texture) and familiar (color/texture) test trials in the 
Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition.  Participants in the Generalization-by-Shape 
Condition looked equally long at the novel (shape) and familiar (shape) test trials.  The 
significant recovery of looking time toward test trials in both conditions indicates that 
infants were able to discriminate changes in color/texture and shape.  The equal looking 
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times during the two kinds of test trials indicates that they did not prioritize substance or 
shape information when generalizing learning these objects. 
 The results from Experiments 5 and 6 cast doubt on the hypothesis that infants 
show adult-like, domain-specific classification of food objects or food substances.  One 
open question, however, is whether infants’ behavior in these experiments is specific to 
the domain of food, or whether the same patterns would be observed if infants were 
tested with artifact objects of similar appearance.  Previous work has shown that infants 
generalize learning about nonobvious properties (e.g., rattling) of artifacts by shape, over 
changes in texture (Graham et al., 2004; Welder & Graham, 2001).  It is not clear 
whether younger infants will show the same learning and generalization for artifact 
objects.  Experiment 7 used the method and displays of Experiment 6 to ask whether 8-
month-old infants attend to shape when generalizing learning about novel artifacts.  
5.13. Experiment 7 
 Infants in Experiment 7 were shown the same stimuli as infants in Experiment 6, 
however the objects were presented as rattles rather than as foods.  Infants were tested 
only for generalization by shape (across a change in color/texture).  During habituation, 
infants watched trials in which an actor picked up an object with a particular color/texture 
and shape (e.g., a green sugar-coated object in the shape of a champagne glass) and 
rattled it twice.  For the test phase, infants watched one trial in which the actor used an 
object with the same shape, but new color/texture (e.g., an orange smooth object in the 
shape of a champagne glass) vs. trials in which she used an object with a new shape and 
new color/texture (e.g., an orange smooth object in the shape of a bowl).  If young infants 
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generalize learning about artifacts by shape, they were expected to look longer at test 
trials in which the actor rattled the object with the new shape. 
5.14. Method 
 The method was similar to Experiment 6, with the following exceptions:  The 
participants were 16 8-month-old infants (7 females; M=8 months, 4 days; range = 7 
months, 20 days – 8 months, 20 days).  The data of 7 additional infants were excluded 
from analyses for failure to habituate (n=4), fussiness (n=2), and parental interference 
(n=1). 
 Instead of tasting the objects, the actor used them as rattles.  To accomplish the 
rattling noise, an experimenter (standing behind the actor, not visible to infants), shook a 
cup filled with beads in synchrony with the actor’s shaking motions.  For the 
familiarization trial, the actor picked up the object, said “what’s this?” to draw infants’ 
attention, raised the object to the side of her face, shook the object twice, said “wow”, 
placed the object on the white shelf, and then looked down.  On habituation and test 
trials, the actor simply picked up the object, raised it to the side of her face, shook it 
twice, placed the object on the white shelf, and then looked down.  As in the previous 
studies, infants’ looking was recorded once the actor’s hand came to rest on the object.   
 All 16 infants were tested for generalization by shape (across a change in 
color/texture).  On the familiar test trial, the actor shook an object with a familiar shape 
and novel color/texture.  On novel test trial, the actor shook an object with a novel shape 
and novel color/texture.  Both of the test objects made the same rattling noise as the 
habituation object.  Reliability between coders was 94%. 
5.15. Results 
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 Infants showed no consistent generalization by object shape (Fig. 7, right).  After 
habituation to a rattle of one shape and color, infants looked equally at two test rattles 
that both had novel substance properties, even though one had the same shape as the 
habituation rattle (t<1).  Infants looked significantly longer at the novel test trial than at 
the last habituation trial (t(15) = 3.46, p < .05).  The means for the last habituation trial 
and the first familiar test trial were in the predicted direction, but the difference was not 
significant (t(15) = 1.51, n.s.).  
 To compare the results of Experiment 7 to the analogous condition of Experiment 
6 (i.e., Generalization-by-Shape with foods), a repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted with experiment (6 vs. 7) as a between-subject factor and test trial type (novel 
vs. familiar) as a within-subject factor.  The analysis revealed no effect of experiment 
(F(1,30) = 2.73, n.s.), no effect of trial type (F<1), and no interaction between experiment 
and trial type (F<1).   
5.16. Discussion 
 Infants in Experiment 7 failed to generalize learning about artifacts across a 
change in color/texture:  They looked equally long at the familiar (shape) and the novel 
(shape) trial.  This result contrasts with previous findings that older infants (13-24 
months) classify artifact objects according to shape, over changes in color and texture 
(Graham et al., 2004; Welder & Graham, 2001).  The divergent findings may be due to 
differences in age, as infants in the present study were younger than participants in the 
previous studies (e.g., Baldwin, Markman, & Melartin, 1993; Graham et al., 2004; 
Welder & Graham, 2001).  Alternatively, the difference may be the result of a change in 
method, as earlier studies tested infants in the context of reaching or exploratory play.  
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 Infants showed virtually identical patterns of looking in Experiment 7 and the 
Generalization-by-Shape Condition of Experiment 6.  Thus, infants responded to property 
changes in the same manner, regardless of whether the objects were eaten as foods or 
used as artifacts.   
 6. General Discussion of Part 3 
 The results from Experiments 4-6 provide evidence that 8-month-old infants 
detect and remember properties of food substances, objects, and containers when 
observing eating events.  We found no evidence, however, that infants use these 
properties to track food substances over changes in their containers or shapes.  Likewise, 
we found no evidence that infants track solid objects – whether food containers, food 
objects, or rattles – by their shapes, over changes in their contents or substance 
properties.  Unlike adults, young children, and nonhuman primates, the infants in our 
experiments did not privilege changes in food color/texture over changes in food 
(container or object) shape.  Moreover, infants in Experiment 7 did not generalize 
learning about artifacts by shape, over changes in color/texture.  
  The results of Experiment 7 are especially surprising in light of previous studies 
that have demonstrated shape-based learning by infants.  Older infants generalize 
learning about novel artifacts (e.g., rattles) by shape, over changes in texture (e.g., 
Graham et al., 2004; Welder & Graham, 2001).  Thus, one question raised by the current 
work is why infants in Experiment 7 did not demonstrate shape-based learning about 
novel artifacts.  One possibility is that young infants privilege shape information only 
when an object’s shape is saliently related to its function.  An object’s capacity to rattle, 
however, is often unrelated to its shape or external features.  Perhaps young infants would 
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demonstrate shape-based learning if they were taught about objects whose functions and 
forms were related (e.g., Brown, 1990; Imai & Genter, 1997).  
 Whatever the reasons for the negative findings of Experiment 7, the experiments 
in this section cast doubt on the hypothesis that infants show selective learning and 
generalization about foods and nonfoods, privileging substance properties for food.  In 
this respect, the findings converge with the findings of the experiments in Part 2, in 
which infants failed to show selective individuation of food objects by privileging 
substance properties.  Beyond the findings in Part 2, the present studies show that infants 
fail to show domain-specific processing of food objects even when they have observed 
another person tasting the objects, providing information that the objects are edible.  
Together, Experiments 2-7 provide evidence for striking commonalities in infants’ 
processing of objects across the food and artifact domains. 
The findings of Experiments 4-7 contrast markedly with those of Experiment 1.  
Whereas adult rhesus monkeys showed distinctive patterns of generalization of learning 
for foods and artifacts, human infants did not. We now turn to this contrast, and its 
implications for the core knowledge hypothesis. 
7. General Discussion 
Do humans and nonhuman primates have a dedicated system for detecting and 
categorizing foods?  The present experiments began to address this question through 
studies of monkeys tested with unfamiliar food objects, and through studies of human 
infants.  On the one hand, Experiment 1 provides evidence that adult monkeys show 
domain-specific learning about food objects, privileging color over shape.  Because they 
live on an island that provides limited natural food objects, and receive half of their 
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nourishment from monkey chow, these findings provide suggestive evidence for such a 
core system.   
Nevertheless, evidence from these monkeys is not sufficient, in itself, to provide 
evidence for a system of core knowledge.  Though adult monkeys on Cayo Santiago have 
had less experience with diverse foods than monkeys living in the wild, they have had 
opportunities to engage in food selection and learning.  Studies of infants are therefore 
still necessary to shed further light on whether perception and categorization of foods is 
guided by a core system of knowledge in monkeys or humans. 
Although the relevant studies have not been conducted for infant monkeys, the 
experiments in Part 3 tested for core knowledge of food in human infants.  In contrast to 
adult monkeys, human infants showed no evidence for domain-specific parsing and 
learning about foods.  The contrasting findings from infants and nonhuman primates are 
particularly striking because very similar methods were used with the two populations.  
The studies of object individuation in monkeys and human infants used identical displays 
and similar procedures.  The studies of property generalization employed the same design 
strategy of presenting the same objects, and using them in different ways (i.e., either as 
foods or as artifacts).  Additionally, in the present work, both monkeys and human infants 
were tested with preferential-looking methods.  Moreover, some of the present findings 
accord with previous results from other studies of rhesus monkeys and human infants:  
Santos et al. (2001) found domain-specific property generalization for foods and tools 
using a forced-choice method.  Additionally, Spelke et al. (1993) found that infants tested 
with artifacts showed very similar findings to the parsing results of Experiments 2 and 3.  
                                                                 Core Knowledge and its Limits 49 
These reasons make it unlikely that differences in methods account for the differences 
between the observed capacities of monkeys vs. human infants. 
How can we account for these contrasting findings?  One possibility is that human 
infants possess a core system for reasoning about foods according to relevant visual 
properties, but that our methods did not detect this system.  For example, Experiments 2 
and 3 presented infants with food objects but, consistent with the monkey studies on 
which they were based, they did not show infants that the objects were edible either by 
feeding the infant or by allowing the infant to observe the eating of another person.  
Although the subsequent experiments did provide such information, and yielded similarly 
negative findings, future research could repeat the methods of Experiments 2 and 3, but 
provide infants with richer cues regarding the edibility of the objects.   
As a second possibility, 8-month-old infants may know that color and texture are 
more relevant properties than shape in the food domain, but the methods of Experiments 
4-6 may not have been sensitive enough to detect this knowledge because the test events 
present changes in both shape and substance. Numerous studies of infants cast doubt on 
this possibility:  Research in which multiple properties of displays change from the 
habituation or familiarization phase to the test phase and infants’ looking toward one test 
stimulus vs. another is compared are quite common in research with infants, and these 
studies often reveal significant looking time differences and positive effects (e.g., Eimas 
& Quinn, 1994; Hespos, Ferry, & Ripps, in press; Hespos, Saylor, & Grossman, 2009; 
Kellman & Spelke, 1983; Quinn & Eimas, 1996; Woodward, 1998).  Nevertheless, 
perhaps our displays were too complex or perhaps the property differences we presented 
were too extreme to show successful generalization by infants.  Additional research on 
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infants’ categorization of food objects and substances could present more dramatic 
changes in color/texture and less dramatic changes in object and container shape, in order 
to ask whether infants are capable of generalizing learning about foods under simpler or 
more salient conditions.  Finally, future studies could employ methods such as reaching 
and crawling to assess the development of infants’ and toddlers’ perception and 
categorization in the food domain. 
A third possibility is that there is a core system for representing food in accord 
with substance information and other natural properties, but it emerges later in human 
development.  This explanation seems especially plausible since human infants, like other 
mammals, have a long period of nursing (Rozin & Pelchat, 1988) and therefore are not 
actively engaged in their own food selection.  Because parents are largely responsible for 
their young children’s diets, infants and toddlers may not need mechanisms for 
determining whether a food is familiar or novel, safe or hazardous, or nutritious or 
nonnutritive in early infancy.  In support of this idea, studies by Rozin and colleagues 
have shown that infants and toddlers are willing to put nearly anything in their mouths, 
including entities that are inedible, disgusting, and dangerous (Rozin, Fallon, & 
Augustoni-Ziskind, 1986; Rozin, Hammer, Oster, Horowitz, & Marmora, 1986).  In fact, 
though children begin to use sensory features to guide food selection in the preschool 
years, a complete mature food rejection taxonomy does not seem to emerge until middle 
childhood (Fallon et al., 1984; Rozin, Fallon, & Augustoni-Ziskind, 1985). 
Cashdan (1994, 1998) has proposed that the first two to three years of life is a 
sensitive period for learning about food.  In support of this assertion, Cashdan notes that 
while children aged one to two years are very willing to try new foods, their 
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receptiveness declines significantly between two and four years of age.  In order to 
display neophobia toward foods, of course, children must be able to use perceptible 
properties such as color and texture to determine which foods are novel and which are 
familiar.  Interestingly, the children who participated in the food categorization studies 
conducted by Lavin and Hall (2002), Macario (1991), and Santos et al. (2002) were all 
around the age at which children typically begin to show neophobic reactions to foods. 
A final possibility is that there is no core system dedicated to the identification 
and categorization of foods.  Instead, humans and monkeys may learn which properties 
are relevant to individuating and categorizing food objects. For example, human infants 
may learn that color and textural properties are correlated with how food objects taste, 
and that shape properties are correlated with how artifact objects function.   Similarly, 
monkeys in the present population may learn about substance-taste correlations by eating 
dirt vs. leaves, and they may learn about object functions perhaps by opening food bins 
and manipulating water dispensers on the island.  
 An additional mechanism – available both to human infants and to monkeys – 
allows learning about different kinds of objects by observation of the behaviors of others 
(e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Mumme & Fernald, 2003; Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 
1993).  In the domain of food, for example, the choices and preferences of others are 
available to guide infants’ early learning and food selection.  Many animals, including 
rats (e.g., Galef & Whiskin, 1995), lambs (e.g., Mirza & Provenza, 1990), and 
chimpanzees (e.g., Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2005), are influenced by the behaviors of 
conspecifics when making their own food selections (see Galef, 1996 and Galef & Beck, 
1990, for reviews).   
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Studies of young children have also shown an effect of social modeling on 
children’s food acceptance (e.g., Addessi, Galloway, Visalberghi, & Birch, 2005; Birch, 
1980; Duncker, 1938; Harper & Sanders, 1975; Hendy & Raudenbush, 2000; Shutts, 
Kinzler, McKee, & Spelke, in press).  For example, 12-month-old infants preferentially 
reach for a food endorsed by an adult speaker of their own language over an adult speaker 
of a foreign language, even when infants know that both foods are highly palatable 
(Shutts, Kinzler et al., in press).  Thus, even infants may learn food preferences from 
observing choices of those in their culture (Rozin, 1988; 2007; c.f. Rozin, 1991). 
Although the present research does not decide among these accounts, its results 
make two contributions.  First, the findings limit the space of hypotheses concerning the 
origins of domain-specific reasoning about foods.  If there is a core system for learning 
about foods, then it differs from other systems of core knowledge in humans by emerging 
considerably later.  If general-purpose mechanisms support learning about foods, then 
this learning can proceed under somewhat impoverished experiences in monkeys. 
Second, the findings illustrate a research strategy that can be pursued to address these 
questions, by studying primates raised under more tightly controlled conditions, and by 
studying developmental changes in human infants, paced both to changes in experience 
and in maturational state.  We hope that the present research, and the contrasting 
evidence it has yielded, serves as an impetus in this direction. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Displays from Experiment 1.  After familiarization with a single object (e.g., 
left), the monkey viewed test displays with an object of the same shape but novel color 
(center) and an object of the same color but novel shape (right). 
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1 of the present paper and Experiment 1 of Santos et 
al. (2003). 
Figure 3. Displays from the experimental conditions of Experiments 2 and 3.  
Figure 4. Results from Experiments 2 and 3. 
Figure 5. Example displays from the Generalization-by-Color/Texture Condition of 
Experiment 5.  The same events were used in the other conditions of Experiments 4 and 
5, arranged so that only one property varied during the test phase (Experiment 4) or so 
that the test trials presented a novel vs. familiar container with a novel substance 
(Generalization-by-Container Condition, Experiment 5). 
Figure 6. Results from Experiments 4 and 5. 
Figure 7. Results from Experiments 6 and 7. 
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